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Abstract
When the Japanese government adopted Western medicine in the late nineteenth century, it left intact the 
infrastructure of primary care by giving licenses to the existing practitioners and by initially setting the hurdle for 
entry into medical school low. Public financing of hospitals was kept minimal so that almost all of their revenue 
came from patient charges. When social health insurance (SHI) was introduced in 1927, benefits were focused 
on primary care services delivered by physicians in clinics, and not on hospital services. This was reflected in 
the development and subsequent revisions of the fee schedule. The policy decisions which have helped to retain 
primary care services might provide lessons for achieving universal health coverage in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs).
Keywords: Primary Care, Medical Schools, Licensing, Specialists, Fee Schedule
Copyright: © 2016 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: Ikegami N. Achieving universal health coverage by focusing on primary care in Japan: lessons for low- 
and middle-income countries. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2016;5(5):291–293. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2016.22
*Correspondence to:
Naoki Ikegami
Email: nikegami@a5.keio.jp
Article History:
Received: 5 January 2016
Accepted: 22 February 2016
ePublished: 25 February 2016
    Editorial
Keio University, Tokyo, Japan
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2016, 5(5), 291–293 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2016.22
The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage (UHC) stated that priority setting is unavoidable on 
the path to UHC.1-3 Hard decisions must be made to deny 
services which are effective, but not cost-effective, in order 
to stay within the budget. In practical terms, it would mean 
prioritizing primary care in rural areas over specialist services 
in big urban hospitals.4 However, this would be difficult to 
implement given the power of the elite and of the hospital 
specialists.5 Moreover, even if it could be realized, the public 
sector has generally not been effective in delivering primary 
care services, so that the poor in many countries may continue 
to visit unlicensed practitioners.6,7 These fundamental issues 
have not been addressed by the “evidence-based” approach for 
achieving UHC.8 For these reasons, the historical decisions 
made in Japan that forced physicians to focus on primary care 
services might provide some lessons for low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs).9
Historical Decisions Made in Japan
Private practitioners of traditional medicine were already 
well-established by the middle of the 18th century. They had 
the freedom to open their own practice and this principle 
remained essentially intact even after the government 
embarked on rapid modernization throughout society from 
1868, mainly because the transition to Western medicine 
was made gradually. In 1883, the government decided to 
give formal medical licenses to practitioners of traditional 
medicine (and their sons if 25 years or older). This assured 
the livelihood of existing practitioners, maintained access to 
service for the general population, and left intact the basic 
structure of the delivery system. However, from the following 
year, licenses could only be obtained by either graduating 
from designated exam-waived medical schools, or by passing 
the national licensure exam after studying in non-exam-
waived schools. The latter path was eventually closed in 1914, 
but medical schools below the university level continued to 
exist until 1952. 
Although legally all those licensed had equal status, there 
was hierarchy among physicians based on the status of the 
medical school from which they had graduated. Positions 
in big urban hospitals were generally reserved for physicians 
who had graduated from higher tier schools while those from 
the lower tier went into private practice. Once in private 
practice, they could not use hospital facilities, so that despite 
their training as specialists, they had to focus on primary care 
services. This meant that the supply of specialist services was 
effectively constrained by the number of positions in the big 
hospitals. These positions remained limited because of the 
way hospitals developed in Japan. 
Hospitals were established as a workshop for physicians 
to treat patients by Western medicine, and not as charity 
organizations for the poor. Hospitals openly listed their fees 
at a time when most physicians were still hesitant to do so. 
Most were established by physicians as extensions of their 
clinics. Even among the few hospitals owned by philanthropic 
organizations, almost all of their revenue came from patient 
charges. As a result, the poor generally could not access 
hospitals. The number of public hospitals decreased after the 
national government issued a decree in 1887 as part of a fiscal 
austerity policy which prohibited local governments from 
subsidizing their medical schools, and consequently their 
attached hospitals, which led to the closure of all but three.10 
The national government restricted the function of hospitals 
to teaching medical students, to isolating patients with 
communicable diseases (initially cholera then tuberculosis), 
and to treating patients with combat-related injuries and 
diseases for the army and navy. 
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The scarcity of well-equipped hospitals and university-
educated physicians led to hospital positions being controlled 
by the professors who headed clinical departments in medical 
schools. By doing so, hospitals could secure well-qualified 
physicians, while university professors could secure positions 
in well-equipped hospitals for the young doctors they have 
trained. This led to a hierarchy among physicians based on 
the status of the medical school and on the year of graduation, 
which, together with rivalry among universities and a focus 
on research, retarded the development of specialist societies 
based on relationship among peers.
Encouraging Primary Care and Containing Costs by the 
Fee Schedule
The historical development of the delivery system has been 
reflected and reinforced by the fee schedule for social health 
insurance (SHI) that was implemented in 1927. At that time, 
70% of the physicians were based in clinics, and only 30% 
in hospitals. Moreover, since only blue-collar workers were 
initially covered by SHI, hospitals did not play an active 
role as they were focused on patients with high-income. 
Consequently, the original fee schedule was weighted to 
primary care services, and the Japan Medical Association 
(JMA), which was dominated by clinic-based physicians, 
negotiated on the behalf of all providers in its subsequent 
revisions. 
This fee schedule was eventually adopted by the other SHI 
plans and was made applicable to all plans in 1959. Although 
the proportion of physicians-based in hospitals has increased 
to compose the current two-thirds, the JMA has continued 
to be the main actor in the revisions of the fee schedule. As a 
result, clinic-based physicians focusing on primary care tend 
to have higher income than hospital-based specialists because 
the specialists’ organizations have remained comparatively 
weak. This has led to a balance of monetary and professional 
rewards. Although very few young physicians choose to focus 
on primary care, many make mid-career switches to practice 
primary care in clinics, tempted to do so because of the higher 
income and lower work load. The fact that they do not have 
formal training in primary care may have adversely affected 
quality, but health indices are generally excellent in Japan.11 
The focus on primary care services and the built-in 
mechanism to contain costs has facilitated achieving and 
maintaining UHC. Costs have been contained by imposing 
a global budget, making item-by-item revisions, setting 
conditions of billing and monitoring adherence. Population 
coverage was achieved in 1961. The amount of out-of-pocket 
coinsurance was capped in 1973. Extra-billing was explicitly 
limited to extra charge beds, and new technology being 
tested for efficacy and safety in 1984. Once confirmed, the 
procedure will be listed. Thus, UHC has been achieved in all 
three dimensions.12
Possible Lessons for Low- and Middle-Income Countries
Compared with the situation in Japan long ago, the benefits 
of medical care have increased and the public is more aware 
of the technology available in big hospitals. Moreover, unlike 
Japan, many LMICs have a colonial legacy of public hospitals 
that were established to provide specialist services ostensibly 
to all. It is no wonder that these hospitals are over-crowded 
and under-staffed, thus providing a valid reason for allocating 
more resources. However, policy-makers must recognize that 
resources must be prioritized on primary care so that all are 
assured access to basic services. The following are suggestions 
for LMICs to facilitate this process based on Japan’s experience:
1.	 Integrate unlicensed practitioners into the healthcare 
system in exchange for adhering to basic regulations 
on price, quality and information disclosure in order to 
increase their accountability. Market-based approaches 
are likely to be more effective than interventions that rely 
on training.13 Where assistant doctors exist, they should 
be given opportunities to obtain full licenses. By doing 
so, the relative share of those providing primary care 
would increase and their power would be enhanced.
2.	 Reduce the public funding of  big public hospitals. A fiscal 
crisis could be the window of opportunity for doing so. At 
the same time, restrict specialists-based in big hospitals 
from practicing in private clinics, and private-practice 
physicians from using the equipment and resources of 
public hospitals. As opportunities to deliver specialist 
services decreases, more physicians would be forced to 
focus on primary care. 
3.	 Design a fee schedule that lists primary care services, 
ear-mark their funding and pay public and private 
providers on the same basis. Encourage the development 
of a primary care providers’ association and make it the 
key actor in the revisions of the fee schedule. Gradually 
expand the services and drugs listed to cover specialist 
services within the fiscal space available. This expansion 
should be in line with the institutional capacity to regulate 
fees and monitor adherence to the conditions set.14
The key to reform is managing the expectations of the public 
on the services they are entitled to, and of the physicians on 
their income and practice conditions. Given the resource 
constraints, only a restricted range of specialist services 
can be made accessible to most of the population. The 
government should deflate the expectations of the public and 
the physicians and focus on expanding primary care services.
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